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authorManorit Chawdhry <m-chawdhry@ti.com>2023-06-16 14:34:31 +0530
committerUdit Kumar <u-kumar1@ti.com>2023-06-19 19:20:47 +0530
commit42b2cf2e522197afb3da66537eb5d7ceacc55ccb (patch)
tree3c912d31a085cd827ec5cb8593963b3e7e394458 /boot
parent13b330292c536a7706f4b67bda888279bb0f04a5 (diff)
Kconfig: Add support for fit image signature enforcing
FIT_SIGNATURE doesn't enforce the U-boot setup to be correct for booting the FIT images, the DTB might not have all the proper nodes and it just boots up without any warning. This makes it difficult to get the correct setup working. Adds an enforcement flag that doesn't allow the setup to have problems and enforces the environment to only pick the signature node from DTB and don't rely on anything else. Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry <m-chawdhry@ti.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'boot')
-rw-r--r--boot/Kconfig11
-rw-r--r--boot/image-fit-sig.c31
2 files changed, 32 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/boot/Kconfig b/boot/Kconfig
index b23959900c..c6058423a9 100644
--- a/boot/Kconfig
+++ b/boot/Kconfig
@@ -78,6 +78,17 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE
format support in this case, enable it using
CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT.
+config FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCE
+ bool "Enforce the signature in fit images"
+ default y if TI_SECURE_DEVICE
+ depends on FIT_SIGNATURE
+ help
+ Enabling FIT_SIGNATURE by default doesn't enforce the U-boot DTB to be
+ having keys and allows booting the images without having proper setup.
+ This option enforces the fit signature mechanism to contain the keys in
+ the DTB and enforce the nodes to be authenticated without relying on
+ the "required" node in the DTB.
+
config FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
hex "Max size of signed FIT structures"
depends on FIT_SIGNATURE
diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
index 12369896fe..8a324733e7 100644
--- a/boot/image-fit-sig.c
+++ b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
@@ -490,15 +490,24 @@ static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
/* Work out what we need to verify */
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
if (key_node < 0) {
- debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
- fdt_strerror(key_node));
- return 0;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCE)) {
+ printf("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
+ fdt_strerror(key_node));
+ return -EPERM;
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
+ fdt_strerror(key_node));
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
- reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL);
- if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
- reqd_policy_all = false;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCE)) {
+ reqd_mode =
+ fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL);
+ if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
+ reqd_policy_all = false;
+ }
debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
@@ -514,10 +523,12 @@ static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const char *required;
int ret;
- required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
- NULL);
- if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
- continue;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCE)) {
+ required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset,
+ FIT_KEY_REQUIRED, NULL);
+ if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
+ continue;
+ }
reqd_sigs++;