From 3324603524925c7727207027d1c15e597412d15e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 14:20:36 -0400 Subject: selinux: don't waste ebitmap space when importing NetLabel categories At present we don't create efficient ebitmaps when importing NetLabel category bitmaps. This can present a problem when comparing ebitmaps since ebitmap_cmp() is very strict about these things and considers these wasteful ebitmaps not equal when compared to their more efficient counterparts, even if their values are the same. This isn't likely to cause problems on 64-bit systems due to a bit of luck on how NetLabel/CIPSO works and the default ebitmap size, but it can be a problem on 32-bit systems. This patch fixes this problem by being a bit more intelligent when importing NetLabel category bitmaps by skipping over empty sections which should result in a nice, efficient ebitmap. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index afe6a269ec17..57644b1dc42e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap, if (offset == (u32)-1) return 0; + /* don't waste ebitmap space if the netlabel bitmap is empty */ + if (bitmap == 0) { + offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE; + continue; + } + if (e_iter == NULL || offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) { e_prev = e_iter; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 892e8cac99a71f6254f84fc662068d912e1943bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 09:40:59 -0400 Subject: selinux: fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change commit 66fc13039422ba7df2d01a8ee0873e4ef965b50b ("mm: shmem_zero_setup skip security check and lockdep conflict with XFS") caused a regression for SELinux by disabling any SELinux checking of mprotect PROT_EXEC on shared anonymous mappings. However, even before that regression, the checking on such mprotect PROT_EXEC calls was inconsistent with the checking on a mmap PROT_EXEC call for a shared anonymous mapping. On a mmap, the security hook is passed a NULL file and knows it is dealing with an anonymous mapping and therefore applies an execmem check and no file checks. On a mprotect, the security hook is passed a vma with a non-NULL vm_file (as this was set from the internally-created shmem file during mmap) and therefore applies the file-based execute check and no execmem check. Since the aforementioned commit now marks the shmem zero inode with the S_PRIVATE flag, the file checks are disabled and we have no checking at all on mprotect PROT_EXEC. Add a test to the mprotect hook logic for such private inodes, and apply an execmem check in that case. This makes the mmap and mprotect checking consistent for shared anonymous mappings, as well as for /dev/zero and ashmem. Cc: # 4.1.x Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 312537d48050..692e3cc8ce23 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3271,7 +3271,8 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared int rc = 0; if (default_noexec && - (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { + (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || + (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a * private file mapping that will also be writable. -- cgit v1.2.3