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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-03 16:13:28 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-03 16:13:28 -0700
commit1a4a2bc460721bc8f91e4c1294d39b38e5af132f (patch)
treefe646d05f6e17f05601e0a32cc796bec718ab6e7 /arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
parent110a9e42b68719f584879c5c5c727bbae90d15f9 (diff)
parent1ef55be16ed69538f89e0a6508be5e62fdc9851c (diff)
Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull low-level x86 updates from Ingo Molnar: "In this cycle this topic tree has become one of those 'super topics' that accumulated a lot of changes: - Add CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y support to the core kernel and enable it on x86 - preceded by an array of changes. v4.8 saw preparatory changes in this area already - this is the rest of the work. Includes the thread stack caching performance optimization. (Andy Lutomirski) - switch_to() cleanups and all around enhancements. (Brian Gerst) - A large number of dumpstack infrastructure enhancements and an unwinder abstraction. The secret long term plan is safe(r) live patching plus maybe another attempt at debuginfo based unwinding - but all these current bits are standalone enhancements in a frame pointer based debug environment as well. (Josh Poimboeuf) - More __ro_after_init and const annotations. (Kees Cook) - Enable KASLR for the vmemmap memory region. (Thomas Garnier)" [ The virtually mapped stack changes are pretty fundamental, and not x86-specific per se, even if they are only used on x86 right now. ] * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (70 commits) x86/asm: Get rid of __read_cr4_safe() thread_info: Use unsigned long for flags x86/alternatives: Add stack frame dependency to alternative_call_2() x86/dumpstack: Fix show_stack() task pointer regression x86/dumpstack: Remove dump_trace() and related callbacks x86/dumpstack: Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder oprofile/x86: Convert x86_backtrace() to use the new unwinder x86/stacktrace: Convert save_stack_trace_*() to use the new unwinder perf/x86: Convert perf_callchain_kernel() to use the new unwinder x86/unwind: Add new unwind interface and implementations x86/dumpstack: Remove NULL task pointer convention fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y sched/core: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK lib/syscall: Pin the task stack in collect_syscall() x86/process: Pin the target stack in get_wchan() x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack when dumping it kthread: Pin the stack via try_get_task_stack()/put_task_stack() in to_live_kthread() function sched/core: Add try_get_task_stack() and put_task_stack() x86/entry/64: Fix a minor comment rebase error iommu/amd: Don't put completion-wait semaphore on stack ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/traps.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/traps.c61
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index b70ca12dd389..bd4e3d4d3625 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -292,12 +292,30 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present)
DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment)
DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check)
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+__visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long fault_address)
+{
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
+ (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
+ (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+ die(message, regs, 0);
+
+ /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */
+ panic(message);
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Runs on IST stack */
dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
static const char str[] = "double fault";
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+ unsigned long cr2;
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[];
@@ -332,6 +350,49 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+ /*
+ * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail
+ * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. Similarly, if we
+ * take any non-IST exception while too close to the bottom of
+ * the stack, the processor will get a page fault while
+ * delivering the exception and will generate a double fault.
+ *
+ * According to the SDM (footnote in 6.15 under "Interrupt 14 -
+ * Page-Fault Exception (#PF):
+ *
+ * Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a
+ * second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being
+ * deliv- ered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will
+ * overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous
+ * address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault
+ * results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a
+ * double fault.
+ *
+ * The logic below has a small possibility of incorrectly diagnosing
+ * some errors as stack overflows. For example, if the IDT or GDT
+ * gets corrupted such that #GP delivery fails due to a bad descriptor
+ * causing #GP and we hit this condition while CR2 coincidentally
+ * points to the stack guard page, we'll think we overflowed the
+ * stack. Given that we're going to panic one way or another
+ * if this happens, this isn't necessarily worth fixing.
+ *
+ * If necessary, we could improve the test by only diagnosing
+ * a stack overflow if the saved RSP points within 47 bytes of
+ * the bottom of the stack: if RSP == tsk_stack + 48 and we
+ * take an exception, the stack is already aligned and there
+ * will be enough room SS, RSP, RFLAGS, CS, RIP, and a
+ * possible error code, so a stack overflow would *not* double
+ * fault. With any less space left, exception delivery could
+ * fail, and, as a practical matter, we've overflowed the
+ * stack even if the actual trigger for the double fault was
+ * something else.
+ */
+ cr2 = read_cr2();
+ if ((unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk) - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE)
+ handle_stack_overflow("kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", regs, cr2);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT
df_debug(regs, error_code);
#endif