diff options
author | Ali Abdallah <aabdallah@suse.de> | 2021-05-20 12:53:11 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2021-07-06 14:15:12 +0200 |
commit | c4edc3ccbc63947e697bd2e30afca8bfaa144998 (patch) | |
tree | e95f8131643d42b4e6af4a07477e239e6266e8fe | |
parent | c23a9fd209bc6f8c1fa6ee303fdf037d784a1627 (diff) |
netfilter: conntrack: improve RST handling when tuple is re-used
If we receive a SYN packet in original direction on an existing
connection tracking entry, we let this SYN through because conntrack
might be out-of-sync.
Conntrack gets back in sync when server responds with SYN/ACK and state
gets updated accordingly.
However, if server replies with RST, this packet might be marked as
INVALID because td_maxack value reflects the *old* conntrack state
and not the state of the originator of the RST.
Avoid td_maxack-based checks if previous packet was a SYN.
Unfortunately that is not be enough: an out of order ACK in original
direction updates last_index, so we still end up marking valid RST.
Thus disable the sequence check when we are not in established state and
the received RST has a sequence of 0.
Because marking RSTs as invalid usually leads to unwanted timeouts,
also skip RST sequence checks if a conntrack entry is already closing.
Such entries can already be evicted via GC in case the table is full.
Co-developed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Ali Abdallah <aabdallah@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 53 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index eb4de92077a8..b8ff67671e93 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -823,6 +823,22 @@ static noinline bool tcp_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb, return true; } +static bool tcp_can_early_drop(const struct nf_conn *ct) +{ + switch (ct->proto.tcp.state) { + case TCP_CONNTRACK_FIN_WAIT: + case TCP_CONNTRACK_LAST_ACK: + case TCP_CONNTRACK_TIME_WAIT: + case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE: + case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE_WAIT: + return true; + default: + break; + } + + return false; +} + /* Returns verdict for packet, or -1 for invalid. */ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, struct sk_buff *skb, @@ -1030,9 +1046,28 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, if (index != TCP_RST_SET) break; - if (ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET) { + /* If we are closing, tuple might have been re-used already. + * last_index, last_ack, and all other ct fields used for + * sequence/window validation are outdated in that case. + * + * As the conntrack can already be expired by GC under pressure, + * just skip validation checks. + */ + if (tcp_can_early_drop(ct)) + goto in_window; + + /* td_maxack might be outdated if we let a SYN through earlier */ + if ((ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET) && + ct->proto.tcp.last_index != TCP_SYN_SET) { u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq); + /* If we are not in established state and SEQ=0 this is most + * likely an answer to a SYN we let go through above (last_index + * can be updated due to out-of-order ACKs). + */ + if (seq == 0 && !nf_conntrack_tcp_established(ct)) + break; + if (before(seq, ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].td_maxack)) { /* Invalid RST */ spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock); @@ -1165,22 +1200,6 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, return NF_ACCEPT; } -static bool tcp_can_early_drop(const struct nf_conn *ct) -{ - switch (ct->proto.tcp.state) { - case TCP_CONNTRACK_FIN_WAIT: - case TCP_CONNTRACK_LAST_ACK: - case TCP_CONNTRACK_TIME_WAIT: - case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE: - case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE_WAIT: - return true; - default: - break; - } - - return false; -} - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK) #include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h> |